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The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a
Post-Frye World
In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia handed
down its decision in Frye v. United States,' a two-page opinion that subse-
quently emerged as the determinative test for the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence for decades to come.2 In 1975, however, promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence ("the Rules") threw the Frye test into ques-
tion, and courts and commentators subsequently struggled over the applica-
ble standard. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 the United
States Supreme Court settled the fierce debate by holding that the Rules
superseded the restrictive Frye "general acceptance" standard. The Court's
conclusion in Daubert appears to resolve any questions about the factors
that courts should consider in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence. In striving to uphold the "'liberal thrust"' 4 of the Rules, how-
ever, the Court announced new standards that may place an excessive bur-
den on trial court judges,' rendering the courts more vulnerable to the
admission of "junk science ' 6 into evidence. This Note explores the cases
and commentary that created the climate from which Daubert emerged,7
and it addresses criticism that the Court did not successfully introduce ef-
fective new standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence.'
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Frye introduced a strict "general acceptance" test for determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
3. 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
4. Id. at 2794 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (citing
FED. R. Evm. 701, 702, 703, 704 & 705)).
5. See, e.g., Deferring to the Experts, N.J. L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 16, 16 (submitting that
Daubert "ascrib[es] too much scientific acumen to judges, whose last contact with a laboratory
was probably as college freshmen").
6. For an entertaining and informative look at junk science in American jurisprudence, see
generally PETER HtmER, GALn.o's REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE CouRTRooM passim (1991);
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Dis-
tortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 93-162 (1993).
7. See infra notes 74-153 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 182-98 and accompanying text.
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Before Daubert, a number of courts and commentators questioned
whether the Frye test survived the enactment of the Rules.9 Many courts,
convinced that the Rules superseded Frye, proceeded to interpret the Rules
and offer guidelines by which trial judges should apply them. 10 Other
courts, however, did not relinquish the Frye test so easily. Because the
Rules did not explicitly refer to Frye, these courts inferred from the silence
that the test had survived the Rules." Some courts retaining the Frye test
indicated that the Rules have no eroding effect on Frye,'2 while others ac-
knowledged that the Rules co-exist with Frye and crafted guidelines that
met both sets of criteria.' 3
9. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 104 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233-41 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Ferri, 778
F.2d 985, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986); United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); State v. Bullard, 322
S.E.2d 370, 379-84 (N.C. 1984); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1250 (1980) ('The
Frye test, which has cast its shadow over the admissibility of scientific evidence for more than a
half-century, has proved unworkable."); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 886 (1982); Proposals for a Model Rule on the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Juaiym-mcs J. 235,240,245-46, 255-58 (1986). For a list
of other cases questioning or abandoning the Frye test, see PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMwINTERIED, ScmInrmc EVIDENCE § 1-5 nn.56-60 (1986 & Supp. 1991), and 3 JACK B. WEIN-
STEIN & MARGAR T A. BERGR, WEINSTmN's EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-36 to 702-37 & n.6
(1988 & Supp. 1993).
10. For instance, in Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237, the court interpreted the Federal Rules of
Evidence to supply admissibility standards focusing on the relevance, reliability, and helpfulness
of proffered evidence.
11. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992) (applying the Frye test in conjunction with the Rules); United
States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "Rule 702 and Frye both require
the same general approach to the admissibility of new scientific evidence"); United States v.
Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that "[e]vidence that does not qualify
under Frye must be excluded"); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 817 (1987) (stating that "Frye is still the law in this Circuit"); United States v. Solomon,
753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing the Frye test as the proper standard for admissibility
of evidence based on a novel scientific technique); see also GIANNELu & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 9, at 10-13 nn.42-55 (listing cases upholding the Frye test); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 9, 702[03], at 702-39 n.12 (listing federal circuits that "still predicate the admission of
scientific evidence on general acceptance in the community").
12. See, e.g., Gillespie, 852 F.2d at 480 (omitting any reference to Rule 702); Shorter, 809
F.2d at 59-62 (citing Rules 702 and 403, but excluding them from its admissibility analysis);
Solomon, 753 F.2d at 1525-26 (distinguishing between application of Rule 702 to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony and the Frye test to determine the admissibility of evidence
based on a novel scientific technique).
13. See, e.g., Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110 (combining the Rules and the Frye test in "a
framework for trial judges struggling with proffered expert testimony"); Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60
n.7 (noting that although "tIlany speculate that Rule 702 does supersede Frye[,].... we view
the two rules as generally compatible and not as mutually exclusive").
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The Supreme Court in Daubert responded to the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the strict Frye test as it seemed to conflict with the standards set
by the Rules. 4 Considering both case law and widespread scholarly criti-
cism of Frye, the Daubert Court settled the issue by explicitly rejecting the
Frye test and suggesting new standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 15
In Daubert, two children, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, with their
parents, brought suit against Merrell Dow. They claimed that their
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy caused their serious birth
defects.' 6 Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment after discovery, ar-
guing that "Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that peti-
tioners would be unable to come forward with any admissible evidence that
it does."' 7 The district court agreed and granted summary judgment.' 8 The
court concluded that, while the epidemiological (human statistical) evidence
presented by Merrell Dow's expert witness was admissible, the contradic-
tory and non-epidemiological evidence submitted by the expert witnesses
for Daubert and Schuller was inadmissible. 19 Noting that the bases of the
evidence proposed by the plaintiffs were animal-cell and live-animal stud-
ies, pharmacological studies, and re-analysis of previously published epide-
miological studies, the court concluded that the evidence failed to meet the
standard of general acceptance in the specific scientific arena necessary for
admissibility.20
Relying on the Frye test, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Merrell Dow, recalling other recent Bendectin litigation and emphasizing
that reanalysis of earlier epidemiological studies "is generally accepted by
the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scru-
tiny by others in the field."'" The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari "in light of sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper
standard for the admission of expert testimony."22
14. See supra note 9 for a list of cases and commentators questioning the Frye test.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 156-75.
16. Bendectin was a prescription antinausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow to relieve morn-
ing sickness in pregnant women. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. The plaintiffs brought suit in
California state court; the case was later removed on diversity grounds to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
20. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
21. Id. at 2792 (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128, 1131
(9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)).
22. Id. at 2792.
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The confusion about the status of Frye under the Rules stems from the
absence of its consideration in the drafting history or advisory committee's
notes to the applicable Rules.23 As a result, some courts and commentators
have interpreted the silence to indicate that the Rules coexist with-or are
insignificant to-the Frye test.24 Others have urged that the intent to super-
sede Frye is obvious and understood because of the clearly contrary nature
of the applicable Rules.' To settle this dispute, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority,26 began with a procedural explanation of why "the Frye
test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence," then proceeded to examine
the Rules in a statutory context and to analyze the language and the intent
of the legislature in enacting them.2 Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."2 Indicating that Rule 402 and its
relevance requirement "provides the baseline" 29 for interpreting the Rules,
the Court noted that the Rules' standard of relevance is liberal because
"'[r]elevant evidence' is defined as that which has 'any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
23. Id. at 2794; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Neither the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the accompanying notes of the advisory
committee ... explicitly set forth the appropriate standard by which the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence is to be established."); 2 STEPHmn A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN,
FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANuAL 15 (5th ed. 1990) (interpreting silence as retention of Frye
and noting that "it was highly unlikely the Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to
overrule the vast majority of cases excluding such evidence as lie detectors without explicitly
stating so"); 3 WIrNs'mN & BERGER, supra note 9, 1 702[03], at 702-16 (interpreting silence as
abandonment of Frye and arguing that "the silence of the rule [702] and its drafters may arguably
be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard"); Giannelli,
supra note 9, at 1228-29 ("The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence has not resolved the
uncertain status of the Frye test. ... The issue is simply ignored in the Advisory Committee's
Notes, congressional committee reports, floor debates, and hearings.").
24. See GIANAL. & I4WITWELRIED, supra note 9, at 29 ("[P]roponents of Frye can argue
that since Frye was the established rule prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules and since there
is no indication in the legislative history suggesting that Frye has been superseded, the general
acceptance test remains intact.").
25. See 3 WmNsrauN' & BERGER, supra note 9, 702[03], at 702-36 (submitting that "[tihe
silence of [Rule 702] and its drafters may arguably be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment
of the general acceptance standard" and arguing that "[ellimination of the Frye test is consistent
with the underlying policies of Article VII [of the Rules]"). For cases on both sides of the debate,
see GIaNa LLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, at 10-14 nn.42-60.
26. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice Black-
mun. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens joined the opinion
only as to the rejection of the Frye test and dissented from the rest of the opinion. Id. at 2799
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. IkL at 2794.
28. FED. R. EvI. 402 (emphasis added).
29. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
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action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."' 30
Having established the liberal backdrop of the Rules, the Court then
compared specific provisions with the restrictive common law Frye test.
Quoting United States v. Abel,31 the Court determined that
the Rules occupy the field.., but... the common law neverthe-
less could serve as an aid to their application: "In principle, under
the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains.... In
reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues
to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of gui-
dance in the exercise of delegated powers."32
The specific provision at issue in Daubert was Rule 702,13 and applying the
Abel rationale, the Court held that
[g]iven the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a
specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general
acceptance," the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated
Frye is unconvincing.... That austere standard, absent from and
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be
applied in federal trials.34
Thus, the Court explicitly established that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded the Frye test and suggested that lower courts may apply the
common-law standard as simply one factor among several to assist with
admissibility decisions.35
The Court's solution to determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence without Frye as a threshold test was to assign a "screening"36 or
"gatekeeping" 37 role to the trial judge. Contending that the Rules do place
sufficient limits on admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court held that
"under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testi-
mony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 38 The Court
30. Id. at 2794 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 401).
31. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
32. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (quoting Abel, 469 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting Edward W.
Cleary, Preliminary Notes on the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REv. 908, 915 (1978) (footnote
omitted))).
33. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evw. 702.
34. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2798.
37. Justice Blackmun introduced the notion of "gatekeeping" in his opinion. Id.
38. Id. at 2795.
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then carefully interpreted the Rules, suggesting helpful factors for trial
judges to consider. The Court made this suggestive intent clear in its ex-
plicit statement of purpose: "We are confident that federal judges possess
the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the in-
quiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test."3 9
The Court analyzed the language of Rule 7024 to denote two funda-
mental standards for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony: relia-
bility of the evidence and helpfulness of the evidence to the jury.4 ' First,
the Court defined evidentiary reliability by interpreting "scientific knowl-
edge" 42 to refer not to scientific certainty, but to knowledge that has a basis
in the methods of science and is "supported by appropriate validation...
based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testi-
mony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability. '43 Second, the Court defined the helpfulness of evidence by
again relying on the plain language of Rule 702, which requires that the
evidence must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue."' 4 This "helpfulness" standard45 gives guidance be-
cause it "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility."46
As described by the Court, the trial judge's role is to investigate the
proffered expert testimony and rule on its admissibility by applying the
Daubert Court's suggested guidelines for determining reliability and help-
fulness. Emphasizing its confidence in trial judges to review scientific evi-
dence properly under the Rules,47 the Court offered judges five factors to
consider in making admissibility decisions under the Rules' standards: (1)
methodology, (2) peer review, (3) a new consideration of general accept-
39. Id. at 2796.
40. See supra note 33 for the text of Rule 702.
41. Before applying Rule 702, a court must first determine that the evidence is relevant under
Rule 402. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
42. FED. R. EvaD. 702.
43. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795; see also id. n.9 (distinguishing evidentiary reliability, based
on a principle supporting what it purports to show (scientific validity), from scientific reliability,
based on consistent results from application of a certain principle).
44. FED. R. EVID. 702.
45. 3 WmNsrsarr & BERGER, supra note 9, 702[02], at 702-18 ("Expert testimony which
does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful."); see also United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "another aspect of relevancy
... is whether the expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case
that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute").
46. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
47. Id. ("We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this re-
view."); see also infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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ance, (4) the rate of error of a particular technique, and (5) a Rule 403
balancing test.48
The first factor recognizes that testing is central to scientific methodol-
ogy.49 If a theory or technique has been or can be tested, a trial judge will
better be able to determine "whether a theory or technique is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact."50 The second factor the
Daubert Court offered was whether the scientific theory or technique has
been the subject of peer review or publication.5 These tests of review are
indicators of evidentiary reliability that may assist a trial judge in determin-
ing admissibility under the Rules.52 The Court emphasized that "publica-
tion (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a
particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.' 53
Third, the Court introduced a new application of the general accept-
ance test, reevaluating the standard to fit within the liberal goals of the
Rules.54 Though the term "general acceptance" by the relevant scientific
community has in the past referred to the strict dispositive requirement of
the Frye rule, the Court instead reintroduced it as a persuasive factor in
determining evidentiary admissibility.55 As such, the Court noted its con-
tinuing significance as "an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible."56
Fourth, the Daubert Court held that judges should consider the rate of
error and experimental control standards of the specific technique in ques-
tion when examining the relevant evidence.57 Finally, the Court noted that
after considering the proffered evidence in light of the other four standards
48. The Daubert Court noted that "[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
49. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Pav. 643, 645
(1992) ("Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see
if they can be falsified ....").
50. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
51. Id. at 2797.
52. See Green, supra note 49, at 694-95 (expressing doubts about the effectiveness of peer
review and publication requirements, but conceding that "[a]lthough less than ideal, they may be
better than the alternative of ad hoc judicial review of every controversial study that forms the
basis of an expert's opinion").
53. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
54. Id.
55. With regard to general acceptance, the Daubert Court applied the reasoning of United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Unlike the Frye standard, the reliability
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific
community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.").
56. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
57. Id.
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set forth in Daubert, trial judges ultimately should be guided by Rule 403's
balancing test.5" The Court emphasized the importance of this catch-all
rule, along with other specific applicable rules,59 and its application with
regard to the reliability and helpfulness standards of Rule 702.
Justice Blackmun addressed both parties' concerns about the gatekeep-
ing role of the trial judge and the capacity of the jury to distinguish "good"
evidence from "bad" evidence.60 First, the Court discarded concerns that
abandoning the Frye test "will result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled
juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific asser-
tions."'" Instead, the Court emphasized a jury's capability to weigh evi-
dence62 and the thoroughness of the American adversary system63 as
effective safeguards against improper jury verdicts.' 4
Second, in response to the argument that assigning the role of gate-
keeper to a trial judge will "sanction a stifling and repressive scientific
orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth,"65 the Court empha-
sized the distinction between scientific and legal conclusions: Scientific
conclusions are subject to constant updates and changes, and legal conclu-
sions must "resolve disputes finally and quickly."66 Making an allowance
for the inevitability of the imprecise science of law and the possibilities that
the gatekeeper, fulfilling his duties, may "on occasion ... prevent the jury
58. Id. at 2798. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
59. The Court urged that Rules 703 and 706 be considered in concert with Rules 702 and
403. Rule 703 addresses the bases of opinion testimony by experts:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 703. "Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an
expert of its own choosing." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798; see also supra notes 33 (text of Rule
702), 58 (text of Rule 403).
60. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
61. Id.
62. See 3 WEiNs-EiN & BERGER, supra note 9, 702[02], at 702-30 (emphasizing that
"[tihe jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its
deliberations").
63. The Court pointed to several aspects of the adversary system of justice that protect the
integrity of evidentiary standards: for example, cross-examination, presentation of contradictory
evidence, proper instruction on the burden of proof, and the possibility of a directed verdict or
summary judgment where appropriate. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
64. Id. In addition, exclusion of expert testimony within the comprehension of the jury is
"incompatible with the standard of helpfulness expressed in Rule 702." 3 WEINSTIN & BERGER,
supra note 9, 702[02], at 702-15.
65. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
66. Id.
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from learning of authentic insights and innovations,"67 the Court acknowl-
edged the inherent weaknesses in a democratic system of justice. However,
the Court resolved that "the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence [is]
designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the
particularized resolution of legal disputes."68
Although concurring that the Rules superseded the Frye test and that
the Rules delegate "gatekeeping" duties to trial judges, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented as to the proposed factors judges
should consider when confronted with difficult admissibility questions. He
suggested that the guidelines should be developed by future case law rather
than by the Daubert Court.69 He criticized the Court for using dicta to
decipher the language of Rule 702 when, he argued, such "general observa-
tions"7° were not necessary to decide the admissibility of the particular tes-
timony in question.71 Chief Justice Rehnquist further urged that the Court's
explanation of the language of Rule 702 was ambiguous and unconvincing
and that the limited scope of the analysis would serve only to confuse
judges attempting to decide the admissibility of different types of scientific
expert testimony.72 Rather than make the observations and suggest the
standards that it did, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that "the Court
would be far better advised ... to decide only the questions presented, and
to leave the further development of this important area of the law to future
cases."
73
The Court did not address the issue of whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded the Frye test until Daubert.74 Since the Rules were
67. Id. at 2798-99.
68. Id. at 2799; see also Green, supra note 49, at 697 ("Courts must resolve disputes ...
based on their best estimate of the truth, regardless of how much uncertainty infects that
assessment.").
69. Acknowledging the conclusion that Rule 702 does, in effect, establish the role of gate-
keeper for federal judges, Chief Justice Rehnquist urged that judges should not be required to act
as "amateur scientists in order to perform that role." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at
2796 (submitting that "some general observations are appropriate" to assist judges in determining
admissibility of scientific evidence).
71. The Rehnquist opinion argued there were two issues in Daubert: (1) whether the Rules
superseded the Frye test, and if not, (2) whether the admissibility of scientific testimony under
Frye required subjection to peer review. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). His opinion agreed with the majority that the Rules superseded the Frye test,
and, consequently, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the finding that the Frye test was no
longer good law rendered the second issue moot. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, Ci., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. See United States v. Mustafa, 22 M.i. 165 (C.M.A.) (holding that the Rules supersede the
Frye test), bert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986) (White, J., & Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating the
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enacted in 1975, courts had attempted to reconcile the two tests of admissi-
bility. While some courts, convinced that the Rules neither expressly nor
implicitly overruled the test, staunchly defended the Frye test and continued
to impose it,75 other courts either rejected the Frye test altogether or con-
structed standards that combined elements of both a general acceptance test
and the Rules. 6 The Daubert decision aimed to provide a solution to the
dilemma of necessarily inconsistent decisions that had resulted from the
numerous and often ambiguous admissibility standards adopted fin different
courts.
Although not always consistent in their reasoning, a common thread
ran through these anti-Frye decisions-the emphasis on relevance, reliabil-
ity, and helpfulness as touchstones for admissibility. While some courts
relied on the plain language of the Rules to support their reasoning,7 7 others
simply declared dissatisfaction with the Frye test and proposed alternative
standards to replace the strict test without explicit statutory interpretation.78
The unifying basis for all of the decisions rejecting Frye, however, was the
common goal of liberalizing the standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
An early and frequently cited case rejecting a strict application of the
Frye test is United States v. Williams.79 In Williams, the court addressed
whether spectrographic voice analysis that might identify the defendant as a
heroin dealer was admissible evidence.80 The Williams court observed that
"[d]ifficulty in applying the 'Frye' test has led a number of courts to its
need to resolve the dilemma of whether Rule 702 superseded or incorporated Frye); see also
Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The
Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 857, 885
(1992) (urging that "the status of Frye needs to be resolved").
75. For a list of cases upholding the Frye general acceptance standard, see GkNNL.Li &
IMWINKELRiED, supra note 9, at 11-13 nn.42-55, and 3 WansTEN & BERGER, supra note 9,
702[03], at 702-39 n.12.
76. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952-57 (3d Cir.
1990) (interpreting Rules 702 and 703 and indicating that the court should "scrutinize the admissi-
bility of the plaintiff's expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence"); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that "[t]he language of [Rule] 702,
the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence in general, and the experience with the Frye test
suggest the appropriateness of a more flexible approach to the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence").
78. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1992) (adopting the
Williams approach for admitting scientific evidence, which "embodies the standards implicit in the
Federal Rules of Evidence"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978) (employing the standards implicit in Rule 702 without specifi-
cally analyzing the Rule), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
79. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
80. Id. at 1196.
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implicit modification."81 Therefore, the court did not refer to the Rules as
the culprits in the demise of the Frye test, but rather Frye's inability to
achieve consistent results.82 Holding that the evidence was admissible, the
court first distinguished the evidentiary issues in Williams from those ad-
dressed by the Frye test, noting that the issue in Williams dealt with "a
particular type of scientific evidence, not with the truth or falsity of an al-
leged scientific 'fact' or 'truth.' 83
As an alternative, the court suggested that "the probativeness, material-
ity, and reliability of the evidence, on the one side, and any tendency to
mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury on the other, must be the focal points
of inquiry."' 4 Concentrating on two standards-reliability and tendency to
mislead-the court introduced a five-part test to determine reliability. Ac-
cording to the Williams court, reliability is identified by exploring the par-
ticular scientific technique in question and (1) "the potential rate of error";
(2) "the existence and maintenance of standards"; (3) "the care and concern
with which a scientific technique has been employed, and whether it ap-
pears to lend itself to abuse"; (4) an "analogous relationship with other sci-
entific techniques and their results, routinely admitted into evidence"; and
(5) "the presence of 'failsafe' characteristics."85 The court did not attempt
to analyze Rule 702 to define its proposed tests for reliability; instead, it
referred in passing to the existence of Rule 702, but did not explicitly rely
on the Rules. 86 The Williams court also addressed fears that evidence such
as spectrographic voice analysis might mislead or confuse jurors because of
its awesome or "mystic" technique.87 The court quickly dismissed this ar-
gument, as did the Daubert Court, by expressing its faith in the adversary
system. 88
In another case that questioned the Frye test, State v. Bullard,89 the
North Carolina Supreme Court, applying the state's equivalent of Federal
Rule 702,90 considered whether the trial court erred in admitting expert tes-
81. Id. at 1198.
82. Rejecting the Frye test, the court reasoned that "[i]n testing for admissibility of a partic-
ular type of scientific evidence . . . the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists the
responsibility for determining the reliability of that evidence." Id.
83. ld.
84. Id. Although the court did not explicitly refer to the Rules, these factors are implicit in
the requirements in Rules 702 and 403; see supra notes 33, 58.
85. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-99. In United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796-97 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992), the same court explicitly followed its earlier
reasoning in Williams and adopted this five-part test, emphasizing the capability of a jury to
understand and distinguish contradictory scientific evidence and to make valid determinations.
86. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-1200; see also supra note 84.
87. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1199.
88. Id. at 1199-1200; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
89. 322 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984).
90. The analogous North Carolina rule provides:
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timony from a witness who used new techniques of footprint analysis.9
Rejecting a strict application of the Frye test,92 the Bullard court applied a
flexible set of standards to determine the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence.93 The court first looked to North Carolina Rule 702's broad pa-
rameters that admit evidence if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."94 In addition, the court em-
phasized the trial judge's discretionary role in determining admissibility of
scientific evidence. 95 The court then addressed the two standards by which
it measured admissibility of expert testimony: the reliability of the scien-
tific method employed and the relevance of the evidence to the fact in
issue.96
The Bullard defendant, charged with murder, argued that because the
testimony at issue9 7 had never before been allowed in a North Carolina
case, it could not be considered reliable or generally accepted. 98 The court
responded that "the passage of time can serve... to demonstrate the relia-
bility and acceptance of a once speculative and unproved premise. Thus,
the novelty of a chosen technique does not justify rejecting its admissibility
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion.
N.C. R. Evi). 702.
91. The expert testimony in question was from Dr. Louise Robbins, a physical anthropologist
who identified footprints without relying on ridge detail, by comparing their size and shape. Bul-
lard, 322 S.E.2d at 373. Interestingly, Dr. Robbins's testimony was also at issue in United States
v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172, and cert. denied, 479 U.S.
831 (1986), and that court also found her testimony admissible. However, "her claims have now
been thoroughly debunked by the rest of the scientific community." Mark Hansen, Believe It or
Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64. This curious irony may fuel arguments that the abandonment of
Frye necessarily leads to erroneous admission of evidence. However, proponents of more flexible
admissibility standards "point out that much of what is universally accepted as science today was
once considered to be outside of the scientific mainstream ... [and] judges and juries are fully
capable of making the distinction between a legitimate scientific claim and an unfounded one."
Id. at 67.
92. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 380 ("[O]ur Court does not adhere exclusively to the Frye
formula.").
93. Id. at 379-85; see also infra text accompanying note 96.
94. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 384 (citing N.C. R. Evio. 702). Basing the heart of its opinion on
the reliability standard, the court only perfunctorily referred to relevance as a test of admissibility.
Addressing the issue of relevancy, the court applied an earlier opinion and held that "[rielevant
evidence is admissible if it 'has any logical tendency however slight to prove the fact at issue in
the case."' Id. at 384 (quoting State v. Pratt, 295 S.E.2d 462, 466 (N.C. 1982)).
95. The court noted that "the trial judge is afforded wide latitude of discretion when making
a determination about the admissibility of expert testimony." Id. at 376.
96. Id. at 379-85.
97. See supra note 91.
98. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d at 379. Such insistence on a "general acceptance" test implies that
the defendant wanted the court to impose the Frye standard.
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into evidence."99 After noting several other instances in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court had accepted evidence as reliable on bases other
than established recognition in the field, the Bullard court concluded that
the expert's new scientific method was reliable based on "her explanatory
testimony, professional background, independent research, and use of estab-
lished procedures."' 100
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered in
United States v. Downing'0 whether Rule 702 permits the admission of
expert testimony by a specialist in human perception and memory regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identifications.0 2 The Downing court provided
an exhaustive criticism of the Frye test, cataloguing opinions of both courts
and commentators. It then held that "a particular degree of acceptance of a
scientific technique within the scientific community is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is, however, one factor that a
district court normally should consider in deciding whether to admit evi-
dence based upon the technique."103 Expressly rejecting the Frye test,"°4
the court held that the Rules require a more flexible approach to the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence.10 5 It proposed standards focusing on (1) the
reliability of technique used to obtain evidence,'0 6 (2) the chance that a jury
might be misled, and (3) the relevance or connection between the evidence
and factual issues of the case.10 7
In applying these standards, courts may "consider the 'novelty' of the
new technique, that is, its relationship to more established modes of scien-
tific analysis."' 08 Other factors relevant to reliability include the existence
of specialized literature regarding the scientific technique in question, the
qualifications and professional stature of the expert witness, the rate of error
99. Id. at 380.
100. Id. at 383.
101. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 1226.
103. Id. at 1237.
104. Id. ("[We conclude that 'general acceptance in the particular field to which [a scientific
technique] belongs' should be rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility.")
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)).
105. See 3 DAVID W. LOUiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382, at
472 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (calling Downing a "groundbreaking decision... which modifies and
expands the old Frye standard in favor of a more flexible approach designed to accommodate new
scientific advances").
106. Acknowledging the common trend towards application of Rule 702, the court stated that
"we join a growing number of courts that have focused on reliability as a critical element of
admissibility." Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
107. Id. at 1237. The court noted that its proposed standards are generally the same as those
suggested in 3 WFINSTE N & BERGER, supra note 9, 702[02], at 702-18 to 702-20. Downing,
753 F.2d at 1237 n.15.
108. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
1072 [Vol. 72
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
of a particular technique, and the successful presentation of such expert-
testimony in other cases. 109
The Downing court emphasized the necessity of establishing whether
the evidence might confuse or mislead a jury.'10 Under Downing, courts
are required to balance the possibility of such confusion with the reliability
of a particular scientific technique. Because courts must balance "important
policy elements" in determining whether evidence may mislead a jury, the
Downing court proposed that reviewing courts should invoke an abuse of
discretion standard, and that district courts should therefore make admissi-
bility determinations with such review standards in mind."'
To assist trial courts in balancing reliability with the risk of misleading
a jury, the Downing court emphasized application of the "helpfulness" stan-
dard required by Rule 702.112 When considering relevance, the court noted,
it is important to determine that the proffered evidence is "sufficiently tied
to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dis-
pute.""' 3 The Downing court proposed a final balancing test by urging
judges to follow Rule 403 to reject evidence otherwise admissible under the
reliability and relevance standards. Thus, even if the evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable and helpful under Rule 702, "the district court may decide
nonetheless to invoke Rule 403 to exclude the evidence if the court finds its
probative value to be substantially outweighed by other dangers, e.g., con-
fusion of the issue or waste of time.""' 4
Although many courts displayed dissatisfaction with the Frye test and
consequently abandoned or altered it by offering new standards of admissi-
bility," 5 others steadfastly held to the strict general acceptance requirement
109. Id. at 1238-39. The court identified State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984), as an exam-
ple of a case that "cit[ed] use of established procedures and independent research in admitting,
under a reliability standard, footprint comparisons." Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239; see also supra
notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
110. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239.
111. Id. at 1240.
112. Id. at 1241. The court again referred to the commentary of Jack B. Weinstein and Mar-
garet A. Berger, adopting their opinion that "the relevancy approach favors admissibility when-
ever the general conditions for admissibility of evidence have been met." Id. (citing 3 WENs-mIN
& BERGER, supra note 9, 702[02], at 702-21). The court prescribed the relevancy standard with
caution, however, to courts trying criminal cases. To avoid an erroneous verdict, special care
should be taken in this context to ensure that "any weaknesses in the proffered evidence will be
fully explored before or during the trial." Id.
113. Id. at 1242.
114. Id. at 1242-43 (citing FED. R. EviD. 403).
115. See supra note 9.
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of Frye."6 In United States v. Solomon," 7 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the admissibility of evidence based on
narcoanalysis, a novel scientific technique involving the use of drugs that,
when administered intravenously, purportedly can induce truthful state-
ments from a witness." 8 The defendant wanted to introduce expert testi-
mony regarding the effects of narcoanalysis and his statements made while
under the influence of the drugs. 119 He sought to use the statements to
"rehabilitate [his] credibility after the government impeached it with an
earlier confession."''
20
The district court held that although the doctor who administered
narcoanalysis could testify about the defendant's statements to him, he
could not present evidence that the statements were made under narcoanal-
ysis, nor could he testify about the purported truth-finding qualities of
narcoanalysis.' 2 ' Utilizing the Frye test, the appellate court affirmed. Be-
cause the scientific community did not "generally accept" the technique as
producing reliable results, the court held that the exclusion of evidence
based on results of narcoanalysis was not an abuse of discretion. 122
The court reasoned that the Frye test precluded admission because,
although the expert witness who administered the test claimed that
narcoanalysis had become an accepted technique, he also admitted that it
"does not reliably induce truthful statements."'123  Since all of the other
available evidence pointed toward the defendant's guilt, the Solomon court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence because "[t]he prejudicial effect of an aura of scientific respecta-
bility outweighed the slight probative value of the evidence."' 24
116. See supra note 11.
117. 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985). Ironically, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit had emphatically rejected the Frye test just one month earlier in Downing, 753 F.2d
at 1232.
118. Solomon, 753 F.2d at 1525.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1525-26.
122. Although the court did not emphasize the Rules in making its decision with regard to the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence, it did refer to Rule 702 when describing the trial court's
role in admissibility questions. The court noted that the "necessary balancing of the probative
value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect is committed to the discretion of the trial court."
Id. at 1525 (citing FED. R. EvID. 702).
123. Id. at 1526.
124. Id.; see also United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988). In Gillespie,
the court examined the reliability and general acceptance of determinations of child abuse
grounded in analysis of a child's behavior with anatomically correct dolls. The court concluded
that such evidence was not admissible under the Frye test because of the" 'prejudicial effect of an
aura of scientific respectability."' Id. (quoting Solomon, 753 F.2d at 1526).
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In United States v. Shorter,1 25 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia applied the Rules and the Frye test in tandem,
emphasizing the restrictive Frye test. Charged with tax evasion, the defend-
ant argued that he suffered from a pathological gambling disorder, which
caused him to lead "a cash lifestyle." 126 His failure to pay taxes was "there-
fore not an affirmative act of tax evasion or indicative of a knowing and
voluntary violation of the tax laws."'27 The district court refused to admit
expert testimony regarding the effect of the defendant's gambling habits,
reasoning that a lay witness would be no less convincing to a jury. 28 The
court of appeals agreed, holding that "[w]hen the specialized knowledge of
an expert is unnecessary to a jury's assessment of the salient factual issues,
expert testimony will normally be excluded."' 2 9
Identifying the relevancy requirement of Rule 702130 and the balancing
test of Rule 4031"' as foundations for admissibility, the Shorter court con-
sidered the issue under a three-pronged Frye test: (1) whether a particular
disorder is recognized by the relevant group of experts, (2) whether those
experts generally accept a causal link between the disorder and the offense
charged, and (3) whether there were facts sufficient to create a jury question
as to whether the defendant suffered from a particular disorder. 132 Thus,
the Frye requirement of general acceptance was applied not only to deter-
mine acceptance of a particular medical disorder by the scientific commu-
nity, but also to determine acceptance of that disorder's causal link with the
offense at issue.133 Because general acceptance was established with regard
to the disorder itself, but not to the causal link between the disorder and the
alleged tax evasion, the court, strictly adhering to the requirements of the
Frye test, refused to admit the expert testimony.134
Just as the Shorter court inferred that the Rules and Frye coexist-
with Frye as the definitive factor-the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,35 applied the
125. 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
126. Id. at 59.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Shorter, 618 F. Supp. 255, 261 n.14 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 54
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
129. Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59.
130. Id. ("Expert testimony is admissible when relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The issue of
relevance is the preliminary question of law to be decided by the court.").
131. Citing Rule 403, the court recognized that "[e]ven though relevant, evidence may be
excluded by the trial court." Id. For full text of Rule 403, see supra note 58.
132. Shorter, 809 F.2d at 60.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 61.
135. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); see also United
States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the applicability of the Rules but
interpreting Rule 702 to require general acceptance, just as the Frye test does).
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Rules as a foundation for admissibility and used Frye as a limiting standard.
Some commentators view Christophersen as "tightening up" the standards
recently loosened by courts rejecting the Frye test: "The loudest and clear-
est signal comes from... Christophersen [relying] on the Frye standard,
which it incorporates in its new formulation of a four-part standard for ex-
pert testimony."' 36 Christophersen was a wrongful death suit in which the
decedent died of a rare cancer, allegedly caused by exposure at the work-
place to chemicals used to produce batteries. 137 The testimony in question
was from a doctor who concluded from extrinsic evidence that the dece-
dent's exposure caused the cancer that led to his death. 138
The Christophersen court went to great lengths to decipher the appli-
cable Rules, concluding that Rules 702 and 703 and the Frye test should be
applied together as a threshold, and Rule 403, assuring a balance, should be
the final screen to determine admissibility of expert scientific testimony.1 39
Introducing a four-part test, the court explicitly acknowledged the necessity
of incorporating the Rules into any determination of admissibility. 140 The
court detailed the test, noting that the elements should be used as "guide-
posts' 4 1 and should not be applied "mechanically."' 42 The four inquiries
follow:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion,
[Rule] 702;
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same
type as are relied upon by other experts in the field, [Rule] 703;
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a
well-founded methodology, Frye; and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and
703, and the Frye test, whether under [Rule] 403 the testimony's
potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value. 14
3
The emphasis of the first inquiry, "whether the expert is generally qualified
to render an opinion on the question in issue,"'" differed from other opin-
136. 3 LouisE.L & MuELLER, supra note 105, § 382, at 474.
137. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1108.
138. Id. at 1108-09.
139. Id. at 1110 ("The Federal Rules of Evidence, combined with Frye... provide a frame-





144. Id. (emphasis added).
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ions that had concentrated on Rule 702's reliability, relevance and helpful-
ness standards with regard to the proffered evidence. 45
In addition, the court proposed a traditional use of the Frye test as
another threshold requirement, considering "whether the methodology or
reasoning that the expert uses to connect the facts to his conclusion is gen-
erally accepted within the relevant scientific community."'1 46 Because the
court found that under its interpretation of Rule 70311 and application of
the Frye test, the proffered testimony was not admissible and thus the
threshold was not met, it did not address the final prong, the effect of Rule
403.148
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Christophersen strongly
criticized the majority's interpretation of the Rules and its heavy reliance on
the Frye test.' 4 9 Chief Judge Clark, concurring in the result, rejected the
Frye test, claiming that "if Frye is a rule of evidence, it has not survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.... Rule 403 is the better
test."'150 In addition, he urged a "plain language"'' reading of the Rules
and finally concluded that Rule 403, not Rule 702 or 703, should properly
exclude the expert testimony in Christophersen. 52 The two dissenting
opinions also agreed that the majority took unnecessary liberties in inter-
145. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. CL
104 (1992) (emphasizing that Rule 702's test "boils down to whether the testimony will assist the
trier of fact"); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1990)
(applying Downing's three-part analysis, which emphasized the helpfulness standard of Rule 702);
United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir.) (indicating that under Rule 702, "[t]he issue
of relevance is the preliminary question of law"), cert denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); United States
v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting the Downing approach), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1172 (1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (delineating
Rule 702's requirements of reliability, relevance, and helpfulness); United States v. Solomon, 753
F.2d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the helpfulness standard of Rule 702); State v. Bullard,
322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (N.C. 1984) (interpreting the state rule analogous to Federal Rule 702 to
supply a helpfulness standard).
146. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 (emphasis added).
147. The court held that under Rule 703, the district court "validly called into question the
facts and data relied upon by Dr. Miller in forming his opinion," because he relied on an inaccu-
rate affidavit. Id. at 1113.
148. Id. at 1116.
149. See id. at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring); id. at 1122 (Reavley, J., dissenting); id. at
1136-37 (King, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1120 (Clark, C.I, concurring).
151. Id. at 1117-18 (Clark, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Clark maintained that the majority
failed to look to the Rules' plain language, and "[the result is a confusing and internally incon-
sistent revision which gives almost no guidance to the district courts except to restrict the admissi-
bility of expert opinion testimony in ways never intended by the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at
1117 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
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preting and applying the Rules by disregarding the plain language and thus
the intent of Congress in enacting the Rules.153
Although the reasoning and standards announced by lower courts have
varied, a long line of cases has indicated a trend towards the ultimate ero-
sion of the Frye test or at least an acknowledgment that the Rules are signif-
icant factors in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.54
Before Daubert, courts had long been working to invent "correct" interpre-
tations of the Rules, and although the underlying theories were often simi-
lar,15 5 a consistent and unanimous reading had never emerged. Thus, the
Daubert Court, in making the decision finally to discard Frye, replaced the
test by offering guidance that it hoped would be flexible, yet effective.
The Daubert Court investigated both cases and commentary to formu-
late its opinion. For instance, the Court acknowledged its reliance with re-
gard to the reliability standards on United States v. Downing,1 56 as well as
the commentary of Weinstein and Berger 57 and of McCormick,' 58 to con-
clude that "[tihe inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexi-
ble one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a pro-
posed submission." 159
Although their emphases vary, the lower courts and commentators
have unanimously read Rule 702 to require relevance, reliability, and help-
fulness.1 61 The Daubert Court's decision incorporates many of the lower
courts' proposed factors for determining these elements. More specifically,
the Court-endorsed factors of methodology, peer review, a new considera-
tion of general acceptance, the rate of error of a particular technique, and a
Rule 403 balancing test1 61 reflect lower court decisions and scholarly
commentary.162
153. Judge Reavley's dissent contended that the majority" '[tiakes hold' of expert testimony
by taking over. . . .[The court] confuses the admissibility of evidence with the sufficiency of
evidence, [and] changes the rules of evidence without benefit of amendment." Id. at 1122
(Reavley, J., dissenting). Judge King asserted in his dissent that "the majority judicially amends
the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to deprive the plaintiff of his or her day in court.... If the
[Rules] are inadequate in this [toxic tort] context, however, then Congress, who enacted them, is
the proper branch to amend or repeal them." Id. at 1137 (King, J., dissenting).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 77-153.
155. The relevance, reliability and helpfulness requirements of Rule 702 have been recognized
by many courts. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
156. 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985).
157. 3 WamNsmraN & BEROER, supra note 9, 702[03], at 702-41 to 702-42.
158. McCormick, supra note 9, at 911-12.
159. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
160. See supra note 145.
161. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-98; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-59.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-1200 (2d Cir. 1978) (offering
guidelines based on reliability and tendency to mislead), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979);
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The influence of United States v. Williams"' is apparent. The Wil-
liams court refused to apply Frye, and although it did not explicitly analyze
the Rules, their impact was implicit in the court's reasoning.'" The Wil-
liams court identified reliability by examining the rate of error of a particu-
lar scientific technique-a factor that the Daubert Court adopted as one of
its admissibility considerations under Rule 702.165 The Williams court also
emphasized that the methodology behind scientific evidence may be indica-
tive of its reliability and thus admissibility. 166 Clearly, the Daubert Court
incorporated an adaptation of the Williams methodology standards in its
opinion.
The Daubert Court also drew its guiding factors from United States v.
Downing,"6 7 which focused on a flexible approach to reliability.16 8 To
maintain this flexibility in its standards, the Daubert Court adopted the per-
missive consideration of peer review and publication from Downing169 and
held that such recognition by peers is significant, but not mandatory, in
discovering evidentiary reliability. 7 ° This view is consistent with an ami-
cus brief submitted to the Daubert Court arguing that "the appearance of a
study in a peer-reviewed journal does not necessarily mean that the study is
generally accepted or even sound .... [but] [w]hether a particular scien-
tist's research has been published in a peer-reviewed journal may be rele-
vant .... ")171
The Court also adopted its general acceptance consideration for deter-
mining reliability directly from Downing. Although the term "general ac-
ceptance" has historically been identified with Frye'72 as a mandatory and
dispositive test, the Daubert Court reintroduced it simply as one persuasive
factor to discern the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court asserted
that "[a] 'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit,
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express de-
termination of a particular degree of acceptance within that commu-
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (analyzing the reliability, rele-
vance and helpfulness standards of Rule 702 and the balancing test of Rule 403).
163. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
164. See supra note 84 and text accompanying note 86.
165. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
166. See supra text accompanying note 85.
167. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.
169. The Downing court emphasized that in considering a novel scientific technique, the
"existence of a specialized literature dealing with the technique is another factor [bearing on
reliability]." Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53
171. Brief Amidi Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science in Support of
Petitioners at 17, Daubert (No. 92-102).
172. See supra note 2.
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nity."'17 3 Finally, the Rule 403 balancing test, as applied in Daubert, has
been consistently acknowledged as a necessary, final catch-all standard for
trial judges not only in cases such as Downing that reject Frye,174 but also
in cases that uphold the Frye test.17
5
The Daubert Court, although holding that the Rules superseded Frye,
did not necessarily end the debate over the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Just as the Chief Justice criticized Daubert in his dissent, commen-
tators, too, responded negatively to the decision.' 76 Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the majority that the Court's objective in granting
certiorari was to resolve the Frye debate, he criticized the Court for offering
new standards and insisted that the case did not lend itself to a sweeping
reassessment of the effect and purpose of the Rules. 1 77 He contended that
the Court's detailed analysis of the applicable Rules was unnecessary and
confusing primarily because of the "unusual subject matter"'' 78 involved.
Instead, he argued, the Court should have simply answered the specific evi-
dentiary issue at hand.1 79
However, because lower courts discarding Frye had long been strug-
gling to interpret admissibility under the Rules, different standards had de-
veloped, increasing the likelihood of inconsistent results involving the same
types of evidence. Therefore, in remanding the case and holding that the
Rules did indeed supersede Frye, the Court offered suggestions for how to
apply the Rules, not only to assist the trial court on remand, but also to
173. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238); see also 3 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 9, 702[03], at 702-41 (observing that "[w]hether or not the scientific
principles involved have been generally accepted by experts in the field may still have a bearing
on reliability and consequent probative value of the evidence").
174. See supra text accompanying note 114.
175. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992) (see also supra text accompanying note 143); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987) (see also supra note 131).
176. See infra notes 182-84, 190 and accompanying text.
177. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799-2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
178. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the
difficulty in defining terms such as scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and
peer review). Chief Justice Rehnquist added that such difficulties "should cause us to proceed
with great caution in deciding more than we have to, because our reach can so easily exceed our
grasp." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 2799-2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, in
holding that the Rules superseded the Frye test, the Court did not explain why it chose to analyze
the Rules. One commentator conceded, though, that Frye should not be abandoned without an
offer of alternate guidance: "Rejecting this [Frye] test, however, would require the adoption of a
different approach to the admissibility of novel scientific techniques." Giannelli, supra note 9, at
1231.
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ensure some degree of consistency for future courts considering the
issue.180
The Court's zealous attempt to comply with the liberal thrust of the
Rules may have left unanswered questions regarding the role of the trial
judge as gatekeeper and the challenge of keeping "junk science!"" out of
the courtroom and away from the jury. Indeed, initial reaction to Daubert
has been mixed. While some critics observe that Daubert will not change
current standards in those jurisdictions where courts had already discarded
Frye,"'82 others indicate a concern that the flexible standards offered in
Daubert will lead to inconsistent application of the Rules.'
83
One critic, maintaining that Frye should still be the rule, has asserted
that "Rule 702 does not compel the result in Daubert.... The decision in
Daubert increases the risk that juries will render decisions in important
cases based on science that will later be discredited."' 8" However, evidence
that might not be generally accepted at one time may later prove to be valid,
reliable, and probative.' 85 Such evidence is not automatically "junk sci-
ence" simply because it may not yet be generally accepted. Without requir-
ing strict general acceptance, the Daubert factors that identify relevance,
reliability, and helpfulness should prove to be efficient tools for determin-
ing inclusion or exclusion of scientific evidence. In fact, the results on re-
mand in both DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'8 6 and United
States v. Downing'87 "may be some consolation for those fearing that
Daubert will open the floodgates to... 'junk science' .... In both cases
the district court adhered to its exclusion of the testimony... based not on
categorical rules but on a thorough consideration of the helpfulness of the
evidence."' 88
180. One commentator has posited that the Court offered guidance because the "justices were
persuaded that simply reversing Frye would open the floodgates to bad science." Thomas W.
Kirby, Putting Experts Under Scrutiny, LEGAL TuMEs, July 26, 1993, at 538.
181. See generally HutER, supra note 6.
182. See, e.g., Richard J. Heleniak, Expert Testimony After Daubert: So What's New?, LEGAL
INTELLGENcER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 7 (noting that the Court "basically adopted the standards as
applied in the United States Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit for some time now").
183. See, e.g., Donald R. Frederico, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Stirs Debate:
"Daubert" Decision Fails to Provide Clear Guidelines, MAss. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 16, 1993
(Supp.), at S2, SI 1 (arguing that Daubert "fails to provide lawyers or judges with a clear set of
guidelines concerning how the court's new 'scientific validity' test is to be applied... [and] is
likely to lead to a variety of interpretations by the courts, and frustrate any hope of developing a
uniform rule of decision"); Kirby, supra note 180, at S39 ("[Tihe flexible and discretionary stan-
dards that Daubert mandates unavoidably threaten inconsistency and invite arbitrariness and
sloppiness.").
184. Deferring to the Experts, supra note 5, at 16.
185. See HuBER, supra note 6, at 16 ("Today's junk science may be tomorrow's orthodoxy.").
186. 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
187. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
188. Michael Martin, Admissibility After "Daubert", N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1993, at 3, 4.
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The Court put itself in a vulnerable position by granting certiorari to
review Daubert. Although many commentators applaud the Court for fi-
nally undoing Frye,'89 some also criticize the Court for its vague language
and its decision to leave trial court judges with generous discretion and little
guidance. 190 In enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, did Con-
gress not envision permissive and flexible standards? 91 Strict guidelines
would necessarily be more restrictive and inflexible, a result contrary to the
goal of the Rules. Those who argue against Frye but who might also criti-
cize Daubert for vagueness simply beg the question. Daubert's critics seek
simple answers to complex questions. Although Daubert addressed a toxic
tort issue (the effects of Bendectin on an unborn child) the Court sought to
offer factors that could be applied to any scientific evidence admissibility
question-whether civil or criminal-from footprint or voice identification
techniques 92 to non-epidemiological methods of testing drugs. 1 9 3 In turn,
the dissent criticized the majority for making "general observations" that
were unnecessary to the decision and "not applied to deciding whether or
not particular testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend
to be not only general, but vague and abstract."'194
However, the purpose of such "general observations" was to offer sug-
gestions for judges to use when faced with the proffer of difficult scientific
evidence, not to force dispositive new tests upon trial courts.'95 Critics who
complain that these flexible guidelines will lead to the proliferation of "junk
science" in the courtroom may be correct in arguing that such a risk may
189. For instance, Michael H. Gottesman, a professor at the Georgetown University Law
Center and one of the contributors to the Brief for Petitioners, Daubert (No. 92-102), "predicts
that [Daubert] 'will inevitably make admission of scientific evidence easier in those circuits that
have adopted the Frye rule."' David 0. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future
for Admissibility of Expert Testimony, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 48, 51. In addition, Edward J.
Imwinkelried, a professor at the University of California at Davis School of Law, "hails Daubert,
noting that 'the only way to get control of scientific evidence is to do what the Court is requir-
ing."' Id.
190. See, e.g., Deferring to the Experts, supra note 5, at 16 (claiming that Daubert will "com-
plicate the procedure of introducing expert testimony instead of simplifying it"); Frederico, supra
note 183, at SI1 (contending that Daubert raises questions about how to apply its new standards).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. Professors Jack Weinstein and Margaret Ber-
ger have maintained that "the relevancy approach favors admissibility whenever the general con-
ditions for the admissibility of evidence have been met. This approach is in accord with the
general tenor of the Federal Rules-which favor the admissibility of relevant evidence." 3 WEN-
srEiN & BERGER, supra note 9, 702[03], at 702-44.
192. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1978) (addressing voice
identification techniques), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370,
373 (1984) (addressing footprint analysis).
193. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791 (addressing expert testimony based on
non-epidemiological methods of testing Bendectin).
194. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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exist more now than it did under the reign of Frye,196 but these critics fail
to give trial judges due credit in their capabilities as gatekeepers. The Rules
provide that the admissibility of all evidence is in the trial judge's discre-
tion. 197 With the demise of Frye and the alternative analysis set forth in
Daubert, the Court has properly entrusted judges with determining the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence.' 98
Admittedly, the role of the trial judge as gatekeeper may become more
difficult after Daubert,9 9 but that consequence was likely with any rejec-
tion of the Frye test.200 The Court certainly did not have to provide trial
judges with any assistance, a view the dissent would have preferred.20'
196. However, the Court noted that a risk involved with application of its suggested factors
may lead not to admission of "junk science" but conversely to possible exclusion of probative
evidence: 'We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible,
inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.
That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by [the] Rules .... " Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at
2798-99; see also Heleniak, supra note 182, at 30 (contending that "the rejection of the 'general
acceptance' standard is a victory for all of us, permitting challenge to principles which might be
blindly even though generally accepted").
197. Rule 104(a) states: "Questions of Admissibility Generally.-Preliminary questions con-
cerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibil-
ity of evidence shall be determined by the court .... FED. R. EviD. 104 (emphasis added). The
advisory committee note to Rule 104(a) explains that "[a]ccepted practice, incorporated in the
rule, places on the judge the responsibility for these determinations." FED. R. EvID. 104 advisory
committee's note.
198. One amicus brief submitted to the Daubert Court expressed confidence in judges to eval-
uate scientific evidence:
[E]ven the most difficult concepts used by scientists in the legal forum are no more
abstruse than the more esoteric concepts judges employ regularly.... [T]he reality is
that someone in the process must evaluate the validity of scientific evidence. Part of a
juror's duty to weigh scientific evidence includes an assessment of its validity. If jurors
can evaluate validity there is little reason to believe judges cannot be as capable in this
matter.
Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
23-24, Daubert (No. 92-102).
199. Indeed, one critic noted that "Daubert enlists the trial judge in a search for solutions to
the complex problems caused by the ever-increasing appearance of science and technology issues
in the courts." Margaret A. Berger, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Venerable "Frye" Standard,
N.Y. L., July 19, 1993, at S3, S12. Because judges must now evaluate scientific evidence with
more scrutiny, "[m]any federal judges believe Daubert has made their lives more difficult."
Rorie Sherman, "Junk Science" Rule Used Broadly: Judges Learning Daubert, NAT'L. L.J., Oct.
4, 1993, at 3, 28 (paraphrasing U.S. District Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District
of New York). However, to assist judges, "a campaign is under way to educate judges in their
new role as active evaluators of expert testimony." Id. at 3. More specifically, a training program
is being developed by "the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, with
the Federal Judicial Center and the advisory committee for the federal judges in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York." Id. at 28.
200. One critic eloquently endorsed the Court's decision to impose a gatekeeping role on trial
judges: "Daubert recognizes that scientific barbarians are at the gates. Rather than sealing the
gates to all innovative scientists, however, Daubert authorizes and requires the trial judge to act as
a careful and discerning gatekeeper." Kirby, supra note 180, at S39.
201. See supra notes 69-73, 176-79 and accompanying text.
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However, in striving to ease trial courts' decisionmaking process while up-
holding the liberal design of the Rules, the Daubert Court appropriately
offered judges some post-Frye guidance. As a result, consideration of the
Daubert factors that ensure relevance, reliability, and helpfulness should
prove to bar some evidence that is generally accepted and admit some evi-
dence that is not yet generally accepted. Thus, Daubert provides the new
gatekeepers with a more accurate, effective and appropriate guide to deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
AmY T. SCHOTZ
